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WITTE V. UNITED STATES: DOUBLE
JEOPARDY AND THE UNITED STATES
SENTENCING GUIDELINES
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Witte v. United StatesI the Supreme Court held that where the
legislature has authorized a particular punishment range for a given
crime, a sentence within that range constitutes punishment only for
2
the convicted offense for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
In this case, the United States Sentencing Guidelines required sentencing courts to consider relevant conduct when computing a sentence within a particular range.8 The Court held that a defendant
could be convicted and sentenced for an offense that a sentencing
4
court had considered as relevant conduct in a previous sentencing.
This Note concludes that the majority correctly ruled that subsequent conviction of "relevant conduct" does not result in double punishment for the same crimes under the DoubleJeopardy Clause. First,
this Note contends that the Sentencing Guidelines require the same
Double Jeopardy analysis as the one used traditionally. Second, this
Note argues that the majority's decision was consistent with congressional intent regarding "relevant conduct" and multiple convictions.
Finally, this Note rejectsJustice Stevens' dissenting argument 5 that the
distinction between the character of the defendant and the character
of the offense barred a second sentence for actions considered as "relevant conduct" for a previous offense. This Note asserts that Justice
Stevens' distinction is unworkable for federal sentencing courts.
II.

BACKGROUND

OVERVIEW OF THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE

A.

The Double Jeopardy Clause provides that no one shall "be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." 6
1

115 S. Ct. 2199 (1995).
2 Wtte, 115 S. CL at 2208.

3 Id. at 2203 (citing U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3).

4 Id. at 2208.
5 Id. at 2218 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
6 U.S. CoNsr. amend. V.
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The Double Jeopardy Clause protects against both a subsequent prosecution for the same offense after acquittal or conviction 7 and multiple punishments for the same offense. 8 The Double Jeopardy Clause
principally restrains courts and prosecutors, while leaving the legislature free to define crimes and fix punishments. 9 Once the legislature
has defined crimes and fixed punishments, courts cannot impose
more than one punishment for the same offense and, ordinarily, prosecutors cannot attempt to secure that punishment in more than one
trial. 10 Courts must assume, absent evidence to the contrary, that
Congress did not intend to punish the same offense under two different statutes.11
1.

Evolution of the DoubleJeopardy Clause Analysis.

In 1932, the Supreme Court, in Blockburger v. United States,'2 set
forth a test to determine whether the Double Jeopardy Clause was violated where a defendant was subject to multiple convictions.' 3 The
defendant in Blockburgerwas convicted of violating certain provisions
of the Harrison Narcotic Act, 14 including three counts in relation to
selling morphine hydrochloride to the same purchaser. 15 Two of
these counts charged two separate sale transactions of the drug not in
its original stamped package.1 6 The third count charged the second
sale as having been made not in pursuance of a written order of the
purchaser as required by statute.1 7 The defendant argued that second
and third counts constituted one offense, for which only a single pen7 See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).
8 North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969) (DoubleJeopardy Clause did not
bar imposition of a more severe sentence upon reconviction of defendant who had original conviction set aside at his own behest); see also Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. 163, 173(1873)
("[T]he Constitution was designed as much to prevent the criminal from being twice punished for the same offense as from being twice tried for it.").
9 Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977) (where defendant was convicted of auto
theft following prior conviction of joyriding, test applied for determining whether there
were two offenses or one for Double Jeopardy purposes was whether one statute requires
proof of fact which other does not).
10 Id. at 165. Witte did not concern those Double Jeopardy questions that may arise
when a defendant is retried on the same charge after a mistrial or dismissal of the indictment or information, or after a conviction is reversed on appeal.
11 Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856 (1985) (defendant could not suffer two convictions or sentences on multicount conviction where he was convicted of receipt of firearm
by a convicted felon and of possession of firearm by a convicted felon).
12 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
13 Id. at 304.

14 Id. at 300 (citing 26 U.S.C. §§ 692 & 696 (1928)).
15 Id. at 301.
16 Id.
17 Id.
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alty could be imposed.' 8 The Court held that "where the same act or
transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions,
the test to be applied to determine whether th re are two offenses or
only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the
other does not."' 9 Thus, under the Blockburger test, the Double Jeopardy Clause is violated where the defendant is prosecuted under two
20
statutes that require proof of the same elements.
The Supreme Court constructed a different Double Jeopardy test
forty years later. In Ashe v. Swenson,2 ' the defendant was retried fol22
lowing an initial acquittal for robbing participants in a poker game.
The Court held that collateral estoppel was part of the Fifth Amendment guarantee against Double Jeopardy.23 Writing for the majority,
Justice Stewart argued that when an issue of ultimate fact has once
been determined by a valid and final judgment, the issue cannot be
relitigated.2 4 Under the majority's "same evidence" test, when there is
a general verdict of acquittal, a court must look at the prior proceedings and conclude whether the jury grounded its verdict upon an issue other than that which the defendant seeks to foreclose from
26
consideration. 25 Justice Brennan concurred with the Ashe majority's
holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause includes collateral estoppel.2 7 However, he advocated the "same transaction" test, where the

Double Jeopardy Clause requires the prosecution to join at one trial
all the charges against the defendant which "grow out of a single criminal act, occurrence, episode, or transaction."2 8 Thus, Ashe offered
the "same evidence" test and the "same transaction" test to determine
a Double Jeopardy Clause violation.
Grady v. Corbin2 9 introduced the "same conduct" test to determine Double Jeopardy violations.30 In Grady, the defendant pleaded
guilty to driving while intoxicated, then was later charged with reckless manslaughter and criminally negligent homicide based on the
same incident that gave rise to the misdemeanor charges. 3 1 The
18

Id. at 301-02.

19
20
21
22

Id. at 304.
Id.

397 U.S. 486 (1970).
Id. at 439-40.
23 Id. at 443-45.
24 Id. at 443.
25 Id. at 444.
26 Id. at 448 (Brennan, J., concurring).
27 Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
28 Id. at 453-54 (Brennan, J., concurring).
29 495 U.S. 508 (1990), overruled by United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993).
30 Id. at 522.
31 Id. at 511-13.
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Court emphasized that the Blockburger "same elements" test did not
32
sufficiently protect the defendant against subsequent prosecution,
and consequently, supplanted the Blockburgertest.3 3 According to the

Grady Court, the Double Jeopardy Clause bars subsequent prosecutions if the government will prove the defendant's conduct from a
previously prosecuted offense in order to establish an essential ele34
ment of an offense
The Supreme Court overruled Grady's "same conduct" test three
years later in United States v. Dixon.3 5 In Dixon, two defendants were
tried for criminal contempt of court for violating court orders that
prohibited them from engaging in conduct that was later the subject
of criminal prosecutions.3 6 The Court reaffirmed Blockburger's "same
element" test for Double Jeopardy violations, 3 7 and emphasized that
the Double Jeopardy protections do not require that a subsequent
prosecution satisfy a "same conduct" test.3 8 The Blockburger "same element" test is the current test used to determine Double Jeopardy
violations.
2. Enhancement Statutes and the DoubleJeopardy Clause.
Recidivist statutes and other enhanced-sentence laws have been
sustained by the Supreme Court against the contention that they violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.3 9 These statutes are directed at defendants who are convicted of criminal offenses following at least one
previous conviction. 40 The statutes usually include sentence enhancement, parole preclusion, or delayed parole eligibility based on a prior
41
conviction.
The Supreme Court rationalized that a sentencing court punishes
the last offense committed more severely due to the consequence
which the party had previously brought himself.42 A recidivist statute
imposes a higher punishment for the same offense upon a person
32 Id. at 518-21.
33 Id. at 521.
34 Id. at 510.

113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993).
Id. at 2853.
Id. at 2856.
Id. at 2860.
Moore v. Missouri, 159 U.S. 673 (1895) (state statute providing that person who has
been convicted previously of crime shall suffer more severe punishment for subsequent
offense than for the first offense does not violate Double Jeopardy Clause).
40 Christine S. May, Note, Uncounseled Misdemeanor Convictions and Their Unreliabilityfor
Sentence Enhancement under the United States Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Nichols v. United
States, 18 HAMLINE L. REv. 231, 247 (1994).
41 Id.
42 Moore, 159 U.S. at 677.
35
36
37
38
39
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who proves, by a second or third conviction, that the former punishment has been ineffective in reforming him. 43 Thus, enhanced punishment imposed for a later offense is not a new jeopardy or
additional penalty for the earlier crime. 44 Rather, the enhancement is
"a stiffened penalty for the latest crime, which is considered to be an
45
aggravated offense because [it is] a repetitive one."

SENTENCING BEFORE THE PROMULGATION OF THE SENTENCING

B.

GUIDELINES.

Even before the promulgation of the Sentencing Guidelines,
judges had the discretion to take into account circumstances surrounding a criminal's offense at sentencing. In Williams v. New York, 4 6
the defendant was convicted of murder, and the jury recommended
life imprisonment.47 The trial judge imposed the death sentence after
considering additional information from the court's "Probation Department and.., other sources." 48 The Supreme Court held that a
New York judge, charged with the responsibility of determining a sentence under a New York statute with a broad sentencing range, was
not restricted to the information received in open court.49 Rather,
the judge was allowed discretion in fixing the punishment. 50 The Williams Court noted that a sentencing judge may exercise wide discretion in the sources and types of evidence he uses when determining
the punishment to be imposed within limits fixed by law.5 ' A sentencing judge's task, within statutory and constitutional limits, is to assess
52
the type and extent of punishment after guilt has been determined.
Thus, the Court held "highly relevant-if not essential-to [ajudge's]
selection of an appropriate sentence is the possession of the fullest
information possible concerning the defendant's life and
characteristics.53
43 Id.

44 Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 732 (1948) (sentence as fourth offender under Penn-

sylvania Habitual Criminal Act was not viewed as either new jeopardy or additional penalty
for earlier crimes).
45

Id.

46 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
47
48

49

Id. at 242.

Id.
Id. at 246.

50 Id. at 249.
51 Id. at 246.
52 Id. at 247.
53 Id. See id. at 248 n.10 (quoting Sullivan v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51, 55 (1937) ("For the
determination of sentences, justice generally requires consideration of more than the particular acts by which the crime was committed and that there be taken into account the
circumstances of the offense together with the character and propensities of the
offender.")).
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In Williams v. Oklahoma,54 the defendant pleaded guilty to a murder charge and received a sentence of life in prison. 55 Subsequently,
he pleaded guilty to kidnapping the murder victim and received the
death penalty.5 6 The defendant challenged the death penalty sen-

tence, claiming that the court punished him twice for the same offense when the judge took the murder of his victim into
consideration. 5 7 The Supreme Court held that the sentencing judge
could consider the defendant's murder of a kidnapping victim as an
aggravating circumstance in determining the kidnapping sentence. 58
The Court reasoned that this would not punish the defendant a second time for the same offense because though the defendant had previously been convicted of the murder, kidnapping was a separate and
distinct crime from murder under Oklahoma law.59 The Oklahoma
statute required the imposition of a sentence within a particular
range, as determined by the sentencingjudge. 60 Once guilt was established, the sentencing judge could consider responsible "out-of-court"
information relative to the circumstances of the crime and to the convicted person's life and characteristics in order to determine the
proper sentence within a particular range. 6' The Court held that
" [i] n discharging his duty of imposing a proper sentence, the sentencing judge is authorized, if not required, to consider all of the mitigating and aggravating circumstances involved in the crime."62
In McMillan v. Pennsylvania,63 the defendants were convicted of
one of the Pennsylvania Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act's enumerated felonies, and the Commonwealth sought sentences according to the Act. 64 Pennsylvania's Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act
treated visible possession of a firearm as a sentencing factor, and required a five year minimum sentence for certain enumerated felonies
involving visible possession. 65 At each defendant's sentencing, the
54 358 U.S. 576 (1959).

55 Id. at 578.
56 Id. at 578-81.
57 Id. at 581.
58 Id. at 586.
59 Id.
60 The Oklahoma statute at issue deemed that:
Every person who ... kidnaps another, for the purpose of extorting money, property
or thing of value or advantage from the person so seized ...or in any manner threatens (the person so seized) shall be guilty of a felony, and upon conviction shall suffer
death or imprisonment in the penitentiary, not less than ten years.
OKiA. STAT. tit. 21, § 745 (1951), cited in Williams, 358 U.S. at 578 n.2.
61 Williams, 355 U.S. at 584 (citing Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 247 (1949)).
62 Id. at 585.
63 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
64 Id. at 82.
65 Id. at 81.
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judge found the Act unconstitutional and imposed a lesser sentence
than that required by the Act.6 6 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
consolidated the Commonwealth's appeals, vacated the defendants'
67
sentences, and remanded for sentencing pursuant to the Act
The defendants argued that visible possession of a firearm was an
element of the crimes for which they were sentenced and thus had to
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 68 The United States Supreme
Court disagreed with the defendants and upheld the Act.69 The Court
found the Act constitutional, reasoning that it did not alter the maximum sentence for the offenses of aggravated assault and voluntary
70
manslaughter or create separate offenses with separate penalties.
Rather, the Act only limited the sentencing court's discretion in selecting a minimum punishment within the given range. 7 1 According
to the McMillan Court, the Act was not fashioned to allow the surrounding circumstance of the visible possession to be "a tail which
wags the dog of the substantive offense." 72 Rather the Court thought
that the Act selected one factor that sentencing courts traditionally
considered as affecting the punishment and specified the exact weight
to be given to that factor.7 3
Williams v. New York, Williams v. Oklahoma, and McMillan demonstrate the Supreme Court's acceptance and approval ofjudicial discretion within legislative sentencing guidelines well before the
promulgation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Moreover, the
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of taking into account
surrounding circumstances when sentencing a defendant.
C.

THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES

1.

Background

In response to the lack of consistency in sentences imposed by
federal courts and supervised by the Parole Commission, Congress
created the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. 74 Congress sought to
66 Id. at 82.

67 Id. at 83.
68 Id. at 84.
69 Id. at 91-92.
70 Id. at 87-88. The McMillan Court also noted that the Due Process calculus did not
change simply because the Pennsylvania legislature decided to provide the sentencing
courts with more guidance. Id. at 92.
71 Id. at 88.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 89.
74 See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A(3), cmt.
3 (1994) [hereinafter U.S.S.G.] ("Congress sought reasonable uniformity in sentencing by
narrowing the wide disparity in sentences imposed for similar criminal offenses committed
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"enhance the ability of the criminal justice system to combat crime
through an effective, fair sentencing system." 75 To accomplish this
goal, Congress set forth three objectives: (1) honesty in sentencing;
(2) reasonable uniformity in sentencing; and (3) proportionality in
76
sentencing.
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 revised the old sentencing
process in several ways. First, it rejected imprisonment as a means of
promoting rehabilitation 77 in favor of imprisonment as fulfilling retributive, deterrent, and incapacitative goals. 78 Second, the Act consolidated the power that had been exercised by the sentencing judge
and the Parole Commission by creating the United States Sentencing
Commission. The Act directed the Commission to devise the Sentenc79
ing Guidelines, and prospectively abolish the Parole Commission.
Third, the Act made sentences, for the most part, determinate, because a prisoner's sentence can only be reduced by credit earned for
good behavior.8 0 Fourth, the Act made the Sentencing Commission's
Sentencing Guidelines binding on the courts, although it reserved
some discretion for judges to depart from the Sentencing Guidelines
for mitigating or aggravating circumstances not adequately considered by the Commission. 81 Finally, the Act authorized appellate review of the sentence, permitting a defendant to appeal a sentence that
is above a defined range, and the Government the right to appeal a
sentence that is below that range.8 2 Thus, the Sentencing Guidelines
were meant to establish a range of determinate sentences for categories of offenses and defendants according to various specified
83
factors.
Pursuant to the Act, the Sentencing Commission promulgated
the United States Sentencing Guidelines. 8 4 The Sentencing Guidelines outline general application principles and set forth numerical
by similar offenders."); see generally Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the
Key Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFsTRA L. REa. 1 (1988).
75 U.S.S.G., supra note 74, at ch. 1, pt. A, cmt. 3.
76 Id.
77 28 U.S.C. § 994(k) (1994).

78 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2) (1994).
79 28 U.S.C. §§ 991, 994, 995(a)(1) (1994).
80 18 U.S.C. § 3624(a), (b) (1994).
81 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), (b). The Act also required the court to state "the specific reason" for imposing a sentence different from the one described in the guideline. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(c).
82 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a), (b) (1994).
83 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)-(d).
84 28 U.S.C. § 994(a). The United States Sentencing Guidelines were held constitutional in Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
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base offense levels for various offenses in particular guidelines. 85 Depending on the crime and the related circumstances, a particular
guideline provides instructions for selecting and adjusting offense
levels.8 6 The base offense level is on an axis on the guideline table
which specifies an appropriate punishment range.8 7 The other axis
reflects the defendant's criminal history category.8 8 The point at
which the offense level and criminal history category intersect on the
sentencing table determines an offender's guideline range. 89
For example, if a defendant pleads guilty to a drug-related offense, such as possession with the intent to distribute two kilograms of
powder cocaine, the sentencing court begins with the guideline entitled "Offense Involving Drugs." 9 0 The most important elements in setting the base offense level are the type and quantity of drugs
involved. 9 1 Because the hypothetical defendant's offense involved two
kilograms of powder cocaine, he would receive a base offense level of
26.92 The base offense level is adjusted upward by a predetermined
amount for drug offenses that have "specific offense characteristics,"
such as possession of a dangerous weapon. 93 The court then considers other general offense level adjustments, including aggravating or
mitigating circumstances in the guideline, and adjusts the sentence
accordingly. 94 By pleading guilty to the offense, the hypothetical defendant would receive a two level decrease reflecting his acceptance of
responsibility. 95 Finally, the court considers the defendant's prior
criminal involvement within the criminal history category. 9 6 In this
example, the defendant receives a sentence of imprisonment of two
years, which places him in category I.9 7 The guideline table specifies
85 U.S.S.G., supra note 74, § 1B1.1. The sentencing procedure is as follows: the judge
determines the base offense level and applies any specific offense characteristics contained
in the particular guideline; next the judge adjusts the offense level as appropriate related
to the victim, role in the offense, and obstruction ofjustice; if there are multiple counts,
the judge groups the various counts and adjusts the offense level; the judge then adjusts
the offense level for acceptance of responsibility; finally, the judge determines the guideline range corresponding to the offense level and defendant criminal history category, and
determines the sentencing requirements by referring to Specific Offender Characteristics
and Departures. d.
86 Id.
87 Id.

88 Id.

89 Id. at ch. 5, pt. A.
90 Id. at ch. 2, pt. D.
91 Id.

92
93
94
95
96
97

See id.
Id. § 2D1.l(d)(1).
See geerally id. at ch. 3.
See id. at ch. 3, pt. E.
Id. § 4A1.1.
See id.
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a particular punishment range corresponding to the defendant's offense level and criminal history category. 98 This defendant would receive a punishment of imprisonment between sixty-three and seventyeight months. 99
The Sentencing Guidelines give the sentencing courts wide discretion to take into account past criminal behavior, even where there
is no conviction.' 0 0 Two topics relevant to the determination of a defendant's sentence in this type of case are "relevant conduct" and the
procedural safeguards regarding multiple convictions.
2.

"Relevant Conduct"

Under the Sentencing Guidelines, the sentencing range for a particular offense is determined on the basis of all "relevant conduct" in
which the defendant engaged and notjust on the basis of the underlying offense of the conviction. l0 1 Section 1B1.3(a) (2) directs the sentencing court to consider acts "that were part of the same course of
10 2
conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction."
Offenses qualify as part of the same course of conduct if they are adequately related to each other as to assure the conclusion that they are
10 3
part of a single episode or pattern of offenses.
3. Procedural Safeguards RegardingMultiple Convictions
The Sentencing Guidelines contemplate the possibility of sepa10 4
rate prosecutions involving the same or overlapping conduct.
98 Id. at ch. 5, pt. A.
99 See id.
100 Nichols v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1921, 1928 (1994).
101 U.S.S.G., supra note 74, § 1B1.1. See id. § 1B1.3 ("Conduct that is not formally
charged or is not an element of the offense of conviction may enter into the determination
of the applicable sentencing guideline range.").
102 Id. § 1B1.3(a) (2). In order to prevent multiple punishments for substantially identical offense conduct and to achieve consistency in sentencing, the Guidelines provide rules
for grouping "counts involving substantially the same harm" together. Id at ch. 3, pt. D,
intro. cmt.; see id. § 3D1.2 ("Counts involve substantially the same harm . . . when the
offense level is determined largely on the basis of . . . the quantity of a substance
involved.").
103 Id. § 1B1.3, cmt. 9 (factors demonstrating "same course of conduct" include: degree
of similarity of offenses, repetition of offenses, and time interval between offenses). The
Sentencing Commission noted that, "[w]ith respect to offenses involving contraband (including controlled substances), the defendant is accountable for all quantities of contraband with which he was directiy involved and, in the case of ajointly undertaken criminal
activity, all reasonably foreseeable quantities of contraband that were within the scope of
the criminal activity that hejointly undertook." Id. § 1B1.3, cmt. 2.
104 Id. § 5G1.3, cmt. 2 ("Subsection (b) ... addresses cases in which the conduct resulting in the undischarged term of imprisonment has been fully taken into account under
§ 1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct) in determining the offense level for the instant offense. This
can occur. . . where a defendant is prosecuted in ... two or more federal jurisdictions, for
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When related crimes committed by the same defendant are not prosecuted in the same proceeding, § 5G1.3 attempts to coordinate
sentences by having the punishments approximate the total penalty
that the court would have imposed if the sentences had been imposed
at the same time. 0 5 If an offender is serving an undischarged prison
term for offenses that the sentencing court took into account when
determining the offense level for the instant offense, § 5G1.3(b) provides that "the sentence for the instant offense shall be imposed to
06
run concurrently to the undischarged term of imprisonment."
Where § 5G1.3(b) does not apply, the sentencing court must impose a
sentence that will run consecutively to the prior undischarged prison
term for as long as necessary to achieve a reasonable incremental
07
punishment.
The Sentencing Guidelines also provide some flexibility in sentencing by allowing, under certain circumstances, the sentencing
court to depart from the guideline range. 08 Further, an offender
may protect his interests through an appropriate appeal if a sentencing court misapplies the Sentencing Guidelines. 0 9
D.

THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND THE CIRCUIT COURTS

Prior to United States v. Witte,"10 the Second and Tenth Circuits
addressed the relationship between the Sentencing Guidelines' "relevant conduct" and the Double Jeopardy Clause. Both circuits held
that separate punishment for an offense taken into account as "relevant conduct" when sentencing the offender for a prior conviction
violated the Double Jeopardy Clause.
In United States v. Koonce,"' the defendant was found guilty of distributing methamphetamine in the United States District Court of the
the same criminal conduct or for different criminal transactions that were part of the same
course of conduct.").
105 d. § 5G1.3, cmt. 3.
106 Id. § 5G1.3(b).
107 Id. § 5G1.3(c).
108 Id. § 5K2.0 ("Under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) the sentencing court may impose a sentence

outside the range established by the applicable guideline, if the court finds 'that there
exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately
taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that
should result in a sentence different from that described.'").
109 FED. R-.CRIM. P. 35(a) ("The court shall correct a sentence that is determined on
appeal under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 to have been imposed... as a result of an incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines, or to be unreasonable, upon remand of the case to the
court.., for further sentencing proceedings if, after such proceedings, the court determines that the original sentence was incorrect.").
110 115 S.Ct. 2199 (1995).
111 945 F.2d 1145 (10th Cir. 1991).

SUPREME COURT REVIEW

1550

[Vol. 86

District of South Dakota. 1 12 At sentencing, the court took into ac1 13
count methamphetamine found in the defendant's Utah home.
Subsequently, in the United States District Court of the District of
Utah, the defendant was convicted of possession with intent to dis11 4
tribute the methamphetamine discovered at his house in Utah.
The Tenth Circuit held that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibited
the defendant's prosecution for narcotics possession in the District of
Utah, because the narcotics possession had been used to increase the
defendant's offense level in sentencing for a separate offense in the
115
District of South Dakota.
The Tenth Circuit considered three issues in deciding whether
the second prosecution violated the Double Jeopardy Clause's protection against multiple punishment.1 1 6 First, the court found that increasing the offense level in light of the defendant's related conduct
was punishment for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause.' 17 Second, the court decided that Congress did not intend the defendant to
be subjected to two punishments for the related conduct.1 18 Finally,
the court held that imposing concurrent rather than consecutive
sentences did not avoid Double Jeopardy issues.1 1 9
The Tenth Circuit noted that, absent evidence to the contrary,
the court should assume that Congress did not intend to punish the
same offense under two different statutes. 120 The Koonce court did not
believe that Congress wanted the Sentencing Guidelines' punishment
to be larger if the government chose to prosecute in two proceedings
rather than consolidate all counts in one proceeding. 12 1 According to
112
113
114
115
116

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 1147.
at 1148.
at 1154.
at 1149.

Id. at 1150.
118 Id. at 1153. The Tenth Circuit considered congressional intent "critical because the
punishment component of the Double Jeopardy Clause is driven by legislative intent. If
Congress did intend multiple punishments for a single act, then for purposes of Double
Jeopardy analysis the combined punishment would be viewed as the appropriate punishment determined by Congress to represent the gravity of the offense and it would be upheld." Id. at 1150. See also Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 779 (1985).
119 Koonce, 945 F.2d at 1153 (citing Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 865 (1985)). In
Bal4 the Court held that punishment includes all consequences flowing from conviction
without limiting punishment to incarceration time, fines, and other penalties explicitly
ordered. 470 U.S. at 865. Thus, the absence of an additional prison sentence did not
render the second conviction constitutional. Id.
120 Koonce 945 F.2d at 1151 (citing Ball, 470 U.S. at 861).
121 Id. (citing U.S.S.G., supra note 74, § 1B1.3 (Guidelines provide for grouping of narcotic violations into single punishment)). The court found that the Sentencing Guidelines
intended for quantities of narcotics to be aggregated into one punishment, rather than
punished separately. See id. at 1152 (Congress intended to protect against prosecutorial
117
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the Tenth Circuit, substantial evidence showed that Congress intended to prevent this type of double punishment using the Sentencing Guidelines procedure for aggregating fungible criminal
22
conduct.'
In United States v. McCormick,' 23 the defendant had been charged
with and convicted for bank fraud and related crimes in the District of
Connecticut. 124 Meanwhile, the defendant had also been charged
with bank fraud, mail fraud, and related crimes in the District of Vermont 125 Pursuant to the Sentencing Guidelines, the Connecticut sentencing court took into account the defendant's "relevant conduct" in
Vermont, and increased his offense level. 126 Following this sentencing, the Vermont district court found that further prosecution of the
27
defendant was barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause.1
The Second Circuit held that the prosecution of the defendant
for fraud-related conduct, used by the sentencing court to determine
the defendant's offense level in a prior conviction, violated the
Double Jeopardy Clause. 128 Using the Koonce three-issue analysis, the
Second Circuit decided that further prosecution of the defendant for
conduct already used in sentencing would subject him to the possibility of multiple punishments for the same conduct.12 9 The court found
that the possibility of concurrent sentences did not eliminate the possibility of increased sentences under recidivist statutes or the addi30
tional societal stigma that comes from the conviction.'
In sum, when the Supreme Court granted certiorari for Witte v.
United States,131 the Second and Tenth Circuits had held that subsequent prosecution for relevant conduct previously taken into account
132
in sentencing constituted a Double Jeopardy violation.
charge manipulation by grouping offenses together).
122 Id. at 1153.
123 992 F.2d 437 (2d Cir. 1993).
124 Id.
125 Id.

Id. at 438.
Id. at 439.
128 Id. at 439; see generally Elizabeth T. Lear, DoubleJeopardy, the FederalSentencing Guidelines, and the Subsequent-ProsecutionDilemma, 60 BRooK. L. RPv. 725 (1994) (analyzing McCormick, and advocating using the Due Process Clause rather than the DoubleJeopardy Clause
to address the subsequent-prosecution problem in sentencing).
129 The Second Circuit believed that U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b) did not apply where the offense level of the first conviction took into account conduct that was later the subject of a
second prosecution. McCormick, 992 F.2d at 441 n.3. Rather, § 5Gl.3(b) applied only
where the defendant's offense level in a second prosecution took into account conduct
that had been the subject of a conviction and a sentencing. Id.
126
127

130

Id. at 439.

131 115 S.Ct. 715 (1995).
132 McCormid 992 F.2d at 439; United States v. Koonce, 945 F.2d 1145, 1153 (10th Cir.
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FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In June 1990, undercover Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA) Agent Roger Norman negotiated with Steven Kurt Witte, Dennis Mason, and Tom Pokorny to import large amounts of marijuana
from Mexico and cocaine from Guatemala. 33 Agent Norman was to
fly the contraband into the United States, and Witte was to provide
the ground transportation for the drugs once they were brought into
the country. 13 4 In July 1990, the Mexican marijuana source advised
the conspiracy participants that cocaine might be added to the first
shipment if there was room on the plane or if marijuana was not available.' 35 One month later, Witte told Norman that he was prepared to
deliver 4,400 pounds of marijuana.'3 6 Once Norman learned the coordinates of the Mexican airstrip where the drugs were to be delivered
from Guatemala, arrangements were made to apprehend the participants. 37 On August 12, 1990, the local authorities arrested Mason
and four others, and seized 591 kilograms of cocaine.' 3 8 Norman, remaining undercover, met Witte the next day and explained that the
pilots had been unable to land in Mexico because police had raided
139
the airstrip.
Norman next contacted Witte in January 1991 and asked if Witte
was interested in purchasing 1,000 pounds of marijuana.' 40 Witte
agreed to make the purchase and promised to give a $50,000 down
payment. 14 1 Witte also indicated he would transport the marijuana in
his horse trailer and a motor home owned by an acquaintance, Sam
Kelly.' 42 On February 7, 1991, Witte and Kelly met Norman in Houston. 43 Norman agreed to give Witte 1,000 pounds of marijuana in
exchange for half of the money up front and agreed to allow Witte
three days to obtain the balance.'4 Undercover officers took the motor home and trailer to load the marijuana, at which time Witte took
Norman to Witte's hotel room to see the money.' 45 After the two vehicles returned loaded with approximately 375 pounds of marijuana,
1991).
133 Witte v. United States, 25 F.3d 250, 252 (5th Cir. 1994).

134 Witte v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 2199, 2202 (1995).
'35 Witte, 25 F.3d at 252.
136 Id
'37 Id
138 Witte 115 S. Ct. at 2202.
'39 Id

140 Id.
14' Id.
142 Id.
143 d.
144 Id.

145 Id.
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Witte and Kelly were promptly arrested upon taking possession of the
46
contraband.'
A federal grand jury indicted Witte for (1) conspiring and attempting to possess more than 100 kilograms of marijuana with the
intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 (a)147 and 846148
and (2) aiding and abetting possession with intent to distribute marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841 (a) 149 and 18 U.S.C. § 2150. The
charges, limited to the conduct occurring between January and February 1991, covered only the "reverse-buy" of marijuana-the later marijuana transaction.' 51 On February 21, 1992, Witte pleaded guilty to
the attempted possession count and agreed to cooperate with the Government by providing "truthful and complete information" concerning the charged offense as well as any other offenses about which he
might be questioned, and by testifying if requested to do So. 1 5 2 As a
result of Witte's cooperation, the Government agreed to dismiss the
conspiracy count of the indictment and to file a motion for downward
departure 5 3 under the United States Sentencing Guidelines if Witte's
54
cooperation amounted to substantial assistance.'
In calculating Witte's base offense level under the Sentencing
Guidelines, the presentence report prepared by the United States Probation Office considered the total quantity of drugs involved in all of
the transactions contemplated by the conspirators, including the
planned 1990 shipments of both marijuana and cocaine.' 5 5 The
presentence report suggested that Witte was accountable for (1) the
1,000 pounds of marijuana in the attempted possession offense to
which he plead guilty, (2) the fifteen tons of marijuana that Witte,
Mason, and Pokorny had planned to import from Mexico in 1990, (3)
the 500 kilograms of cocaine that the conspirators originally proposed
to import from Guatemala, and (4) the 591 kilograms of cocaine
seized at the Mexican airstrip in August 1990.156
At Witte's sentencing, both the petitioner and the Government
urged the court to hold that the 1990 activities concerning importa146 Id.
147 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1994).
148

21 U.S.C. § 846 (1994).

149 21 U.S.C. § 841(a).
150 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1994); Witte, 115 S.Ct at 2202-03.

151 Id. at 2022.
152 Id.
155 A sentencing court gives downward departure for mitigating sentence factors. The
Sentencing Guidelines give the court latitude to reduce a sentence based upon variable
relevant factors. See U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, comment (background).
'54 Witte, 115 S. Ct. at 2203 (citing U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1).
155 Id.
156

Id.
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tion of cocaine and marijuana were not part of the same course of
conduct as the 1991 marijuana offense to which Witte plead guilty,
and, therefore, should not be considered in sentencing Witte for the
1991 offense. 157 The district court, however, found that the marijuana
and cocaine offenses were "relevant conduct" under § 1Bi.3 of the
Sentencing Guidelines and should be taken into account because they
158
were part of the same continuing conspiracy.
The court, therefore, adopted the presentence report's aggregation of drug quantities involved in the 1990 and 1991 episodes, resulting in a base offense level of 40, which has a Guideline range of 292 to
365 months' imprisonment. 15 9 Witte received a two-level increase for
his aggravating role in the offense and an offsetting two-level decrease
for acceptance of responsibility. 160 Based on Witte's substantial assistance, the court granted the Government's § 5K1.1 motion for downward departure. 161 The court sentenced Witte to 144 months in
prison in light of that departure. 162 The sentence was 148 months
below the minimum sentence of 292 months under the pre-departure
Guideline range. 163 Witte appealed, but the Court of Appeals dis164
missed the case because Witte failed to file a brief.
In September 1992, another federal grand jury indicted Witte
and Pokorny on two counts: conspiring and attempting to import cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952 (a) and 963, respectively. 165 The
indictment alleged that, between August 1989 and August 1990, Witte
tried to import approximately 1,091 kilograms of cocaine from Central America. 166 Witte moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that
he had already been punished for the cocaine offenses because the
cocaine involved in the 1990 transactions had been included as "relevant conduct" in his 1991 marijuana offense sentencing.' 67 The
United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas dismissed the indictment. 168 The court found that punishing Witte for
the indicted offense would constitute a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment because Witte's conduct had already been considered to determine Witte's base offense level at
157 Id.
158 Id.

159 Id. (citing U.S.S.G., supra note 74, § 2Dl.1).

160 Id. (citing U.S.S.G., supra note 74, § 3E1.1).
161 Id.

162
163
164
165

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

166 Id.
167 Id.

at 2203-04.

168 See Witte v. United States, 25 F.3d 250, 253 (5th Cir. 1994).
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sentencing for the 1991 marijuana offense. 16 9
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded the case to the district court, holding that "the use of relevant
conduct to increase the punishment of a charged offense does not
punish the offender for the relevant conduct" and thus does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 170 In
reaching this result, the Fifth Circuit expressly disagreed with contrary
7
holdings in the Second and Tenth Circuits.' '
Seeking to resolve the conflict among the circuits, the Supreme
Court of the United States granted certiorari' 72 to determine whether
a court violates the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment
by convicting and sentencing a defendant for a crime when the conduct underlying the offense has been considered in determining his
sentence for a previous conviction. 173
IV.

A.

SUMMARY OF THE OPINIONS

THE MAJORITY OPINION

Writing for the Court,' 74 Justice O'Connor affirmed the decision
of the Fifth Circuit, holding that
where the legislature has authorized such a particular punishment range
for a given crime, the resulting sentence within that range constitutes
punishment only for the offense of conviction for purposes of the
double jeopardy inquiry.' 75
Accordingly, the Court found that the prosecution for the cocaine offenses was not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause as a second at176
tempt to punish Witte for the same crime.
Justice O'Connor began her analysis by addressing the function
of the Double Jeopardy Clause, which is to prevent both successive
prosecution and successive punishment. 17 7 Specifically, the Double
169 Id.

170 Id. at 258.
171 See United States v. McCormick, 992 F.2d 437 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v.
Koonce, 945 F.2d 1145 (10th Cir. 1991).
172 Witte v. United States, 115 S.Ct. 715 (1995).
173 Witte v. United States, 115 S.Ct. 2199, 2202 (1995).
174 ChiefJustice Rehnquist, andJustices Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyerjoined
in Parts I, II, and IV. Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyerjoined in Part III. Part
I of the opinion contained the facts and procedural history of Witte- In Part II of the
opinion, Justice O'Connor traced the history of Double Jeopardy and argued that the
traditional Double Jeopardy analysis applies to the Sentencing Guidelines. Part III interpreted the Sentencing Guidelines as containing procedural safeguards. Part IV stated the
decision of the majority.
175 Wtitte 115 S.Ct. at 2208.
176 Id.

177 Id. at 2204 (quoting United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849, 2860 (1993)).
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Jeopardy Clause protects against more than just the imposition of a
punishment for the same offense-it protects a criminal defendant
from being twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.' 78 The Court cited Blockburger v. United States,179 which held
that "where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two
distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine
whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision
requires proof of a fact which the other does not." 8 0 Applying the
Blockburgertest, Justice O'Connor concluded that Witte was not prosecuted for, or convicted of the cocaine offenses at the first criminal
proceeding because the indictment in this case did not charge the
same offense to which Witte formerly plead guilty.18 '
Justice O'Connor, nevertheless, went on to address Witte's argument that he was officially punished for the cocaine charges in the
first proceeding because the sentencing court took them into account
during the first sentencing. 8 2 Justice O'Connor rejected this argument, emphasizing that Supreme Court precedent makes clear "that a
defendant in that situation is punished, for double jeopardy purposes,
only for the offense of which the defendant is convicted." 1 3 Moreover, Justice O'Connor noted that the sentencing court may consider
a defendant's prior convictions as well as past criminal behavior that
did not result in convictions. 8 4 The sentencing court's inquiry is
185
largely unlimited as to the type or the source of the information.
Justice O'Connor found this case to be governed by Williams v.
Oklahoma.'86 In Williams, the Supreme Court held that the Double
Jeopardy Clause does not bar later prosecution or punishment for a
criminal offense that was considered previously at sentencing for a
separate crime.' 8 7 Using related criminal conduct to enhance the defendant's sentence for a separate crime within the statutory limits
does not constitute punishment for that conduct for the purposes of
the Double Jeopardy Clause.18 8 Based on Williams, Justice O'Connor
178

Id. (quoting Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 326 (1970)).

179 284 U.S. 299 (1932).

Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304.
181 Witte 115 S. Ct. at 2204.
182 Id. at 2204-05 (quoting Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977)).
183 Id.
184 Id. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 250-51 (1949) (holding that Due Process
Clause does not require "courts throughout the Nation [to] abandon their age-old practice
of seeking information from out-of-court sources to guide theirjudgment toward a more
enlightened and just sentence").
185 Witte, 115 S. Ct. at 2205.
186 Id. at 2206.
187 Williams, 358 U.S. at 586.
188 Witte, 115 S. Ct. at 2206.
180
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concluded that it made no difference whether the enhancement occurred in the first or the second sentencing proceeding. 189 In both
Williams' case and Witte's case, the sentencing courts used uncharged
criminal conduct to increase the petitioners' sentences within the
ranges of the violated statutes. 190 Justice O'Connor likened the enhanced punishment to recidivist statutes, noting that the Court has
rejected Double Jeopardy challenges in the case of recidivist statutes. 191 Under recidivist statutes, the enhanced punishment imposed
for a later offense is not an additional penalty for previous crimes, but
rather, it is "a stiffened penalty for the latest crime, which is consid192
ered to be an aggravated offense because [it is] a repetitive one."
Justice O'Connor also rejected Witte's argument that the Sentencing Guidelines warrant a special Double Jeopardy analysis.' 9 3 According to Justice O'Connor, the defendant is not punished more
under the Sentencing Guidelines' "relevant conduct" than he would
have been under a pre-Guidelines sentencing court that could choose
to take into account the uncharged conduct'19 4 Rather, Justice
O'Connor explained that the "relevant conduct" provisions are
"designed to channel the sentencing discretion of the district courts
and to make mandatory the consideration of factors that previously
would have been optional." 95 Thus, the defendant is punished only
for the convicted offense, regardless of whether a certain act is taken
196
into account by statute or as an act of discretion.
Justice O'Connor then went on to address Justice Stevens' contention 9 7 that under the Sentencing Guidelines "an offense that is
included as 'relevant conduct' does not relate to the character of the
189 Id. In other cases involving a defendant's background and conduct not arising out
of the same criminal offense of which the defendant was convicted, enhancement statutes
"do not change the penalty imposed for the earlier conviction." Id. (quoting Nichols v.
United States, 114 S. Ct. i921, 1927 (1994)).
190 Witte, 115 S. Ct. at 2206.
191 Id. Enhanced punishment of the Sentencing Guidelines is similar to recidivist statutes because, in both cases, sentencing courts consider a defendant's criminal history and
his conduct surrounding the instant conviction in determining his punishment. Id.
192 Id.at 2206 (quoting Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 732 (1948)). Justice O'Connor
also argued that authorizing consideration of offender-specific information at sentencing
without the procedural protections of a criminal trial, does not result in punishment for
such conduct. Id.(citing McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986) (sentencing statute
limited sentencing court's discretion in selecting penalty within range already available to
it without special finding as to other evidence)). See also Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S.
197, 214 (1977).
193 Witte, 115 S.Ct. at 2207.
194 Id.

195 Id.
196 Id.
197 Id. at 2211 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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offender (which is instead reflected by criminal history), but rather
measures only the character of the offense."1 98 Justice O'Connor responded that the difference between "criminal history" and "relevant
conduct" in the Sentencing Guidelines is "more temporal than qualitative." 19 9 She maintained that under the Sentencing Guidelines,
"criminal history" 20 0 referred to a defendant's past criminal conduct,20 ' while "relevant conduct"20 2 referred only to those activities
203
that arose out of the same criminal conduct as the instant offense.
The Sentencing Guidelines aggravate punishment, not for a different
offense, but for a related crime to the extent that the present offense
was carried out in a way warranting increased punishment.2 0 4 Accordingly, Justice O'Connor concluded that while relevant conduct "may
relate to the severity of the particular crime, the commission of multiple offenses in the same course of conduct also necessarily provides
important evidence that the character of the offender requires special
punishment." 20 5 Justice O'Connor also noted that because nothing
controls how the sentencing judges use the extraneous information,
under Justice Stevens' framework, the Sentencing Guidelines' struc20 6
ture would not affect the outcome of the case.

Finally, in addressing Witte's fear of potential unfairness the
Court pointed to procedural safeguards built into the Sentencing
Guidelines.2 0 7 The Sentencing Guidelines specifically address the
possibility of separate prosecutions involving the same or overlapping
"relevant conduct." 208 The Sentencing Guidelines attempt to coordinate sentences in this situation, so that the punishment imposed approximates the total penalty that would have resulted had the
20 9
sentences for the different offenses been imposed at the same time.
Thus, Justice O'Connor pointed out that the offenses run concurrently.2 10 Moreover, the sentencing court may impose a sentence
outside the given range if it finds aggravating or mitigating circum198 Id.

at 2207.

199 Id.

See U.S.S.G., supra note 74, § 4Al.1.
Witte, 115 S. Ct. at 2207.
202 See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3.
203 Witte, 115 S. Ct. at 2207.
204 Id. at 2207-08.
205 Id. at 2208-09.
200
201

206 Id.
207 Id.

208 Id. (citing U.S.S.G., supranote 74, § 5G1.3(b), cmL 2)) (considering cases where "a
defendant is prosecuted... for different criminal transactions that were a part of the same
course of conduct").
209 Id. (citing U.S.S.G., supra note 74, § 5G1.3, cmt. 3).
210 Id. (citing U.S.S.G., supra note 74, §§ 5G1.3(b), 5G1.3(c) (policy statement)).
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stances not considered by the Sentencing Commission. 2 11 Therefore,
if Witte was convicted of the cocaine charges, he could argue that the
unusual facts of the case warrant a sentence outside the range estab212
lished by the applicable guideline.
B.

JUSTICE SCALIA'S OPINION CONCURRING IN THE JUDGMENT

Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment, 213 agreeing that Witte
had not been prosecuted twice for the same offense. 2 14 He asserted
that "the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits successive prosecution,
not successive punishment." 215 Justice Scalia admonished the majority for departing from the text of the Double Jeopardy Clause, which
protects a criminal defendant from being twice prosecuted for the
same offense. 2 16 According to Justice Scalia, the Court created and
reaffirmed the right to be free from multiple punishments, and then
destroyed that right by punishing Witte "twice as much for one offense
solely because [he] also committed another offense, for which [the
2 17
government] will punish [him] (only once) later on."
C.

JUSTICE STEVENS' OPINION CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN
PART

Justice Stevens dissented from the judgment,2 18 concluding that
the DoubleJeopardy Clause should preclude any subsequent proceeding for the cocaine offense.2 19 Justice Stevens argued that the majority's decision weakened the fundamental protections provided by the
Double Jeopardy Clause. 22 0 Witte was put in jeopardy of punishment
for the cocaine transactions when he was punished for those offenses
2 21
at the marijuana sentencing.
Justice Stevens conceded that, traditionally, prior convictions are
important factors in calculating a sentence. 222 He argued, however,
that when a sentencing judge reviews the defendant's prior convictions, the judge does not punish the defendant twice for the same
211
212
213
214
215
216
217

Id. (citing U.S.S.G., supranote 74, § 5K2.0 (policy statement)).
I1.
Justice Thomas joined justice Scalia's opinion concurring in the judgment.
Wztte, 115 S. Ct. at 2210 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id (Scalia, J., concurring).
Witte, 115 S. Ct. at 2209 (Scalia, J., concurring); see U.S. CONST. amend. V.
Id. at 2210 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis omitted).
218 Justice Stevens concurred with Part HI of the Court's opinion, the Court's statutory
analysis of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, but dissented from the judgment.
219 Wlt; 115 S. Ct. at 2210 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

220 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
221 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

222 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Nichols v. United
States, 114 S. Ct. 1921, 1928 (1994)).
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crimes. 223 Rather, the judge evaluates the nature of the defendant's
2 24
responsibility for past acts and the likelihood of future misconduct.
Thus, recidivist statutes are consistent with the Double Jeopardy
Clause only because the defendant's prior conduct is evidence of the
225
defendant's character.
Justice Stevens suggested that offenses considered at sentencing
226
that are somehow linked to the offense require a different analysis.
Offenses that are linked to the previous conviction may affect both the
character of the offense and the character of the defendant.2 27 The
Double Jeopardy Clause is not implicated if a sentence relies on an
offense as evidence of the defendant's character.2 28 However, where
the sentence relies on the offense as an aggravation of the underlying
offense, the Double Jeopardy Clause is implicated because the defendant is punished for committing the offense, not for what the offense
229
discloses about his character.
Justice Stevens argued that the Sentencing Guidelines distinguish
230
between "relevant conduct" and the defendant's criminal history.
According to Justice Stevens, "relevant conduct" clearly refers to the
character of the offense, 23 ' while criminal history refers to the charac2 32
ter of the defendant.
Using the example of multiple drug crimes, Justice Stevens illustrated the Double Jeopardy violation that occurs by the mandatory
consideration of "relevant conduct."23 3 The severity of a drug offense
is based on the total quantity of drugs from all offenses constituting
"relevant conduct," regardless of whether the offenses were charged
or proved at sentencing.2 34 Thus, the defendant is sentenced for an
offense that may be the subject of a second indictment.2 35 The transactions fix his punishment just as if he were convicted of it.236 The
imposition of punishment demonstrates that the defendant was "just
as much in jeopardy for the offense as if he had been previously
223 Id. at 2211 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
224 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
225 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Moore v. Missouri,
159 U.S. 673, 677 (1895)).

226 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
227 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
228 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
229 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
230 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
231 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
232 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
233 Id. at 2212 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
234 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

235 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
236 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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charged for it" 2 37
Based on this conclusion, Justice Stevens argued that none of the
cases relied upon by the majority compel the Court's holding.2 38 In
Williams v. New York, 239 the evidence of the defendant's previous criminal conduct was important because it revealed the defendant's character.2 40 Justice Stevens noted that the opinion did not suggest that if
the sentencing court used evidence to determine a sentence for an
offense more serious than the convicted offense, the defendant would
24 1
not have been placed in jeopardy for that more serious offense.
Justice Stevens also rejected the majority's reliance on Williams v.
Oklahoma because the Williams Court applied a weak version of due
process rather than the Double Jeopardy Clause. 242 Justice Stevens
distinguished Williams from Witte because Williams focused on the use
of a prior conviction in a subsequent sentencing proceeding. 243 He
emphasized that the Williams Court did not address whether the second prosecution was barred because the defendant had already been
244
punished for the instant offense.
Justice Stevens concluded that due to the lack of precedent supporting the majority's decision, the Court should have looked to the
text and purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause.2 45 Witte received a
punishment that included the cocaine offense. 246 Because he was in
jeopardy of a second punishment for the cocaine offense, standing
trial for the offense should have been barred by the Double Jeopardy
2 47
Clause.
Finally, Justice Stevens summarized the protections available for
Witte through the Sentencing Guidelines.2 48 He noted that departure
power is available to protect against unwarranted double punishment
237 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
238 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
239 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
240 Witte, 115 S. Ct. at 2212 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and

dissenting in part). See
Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. at 252 (Due Process Clause not violated where sentencing
judge considered information in presentence report).
241 Wie 115 S.Ct. at 2212 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
242 Id. at 2213 (Stevens,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Williams v.
Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576 (1959)). Stevens also noted that the State's discretionary sentencing scheme in Wi!!iams was vastly different from the United States Sentencing Guidelines.
Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Thus, the Court was free to
accept or reject the reasoning in Williams. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
243 Id. at 2213 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
244 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
245 Id. at 2213 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
246 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
247 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
248 Id. at 2213-14 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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and to prevent the possibility of depriving Witte of the effect of downward departure. 249 Thus, Justice Stevens joined the majority's statutory holding in part III of its opinion, which interpreted the
Sentencing Guidelines as containing procedural safeguards, because
250
it mitigated the possibility of an unfair result.

V.

ANALYSIS

This Note argues that the majority correctly held that, where the
Sentencing Guidelines have authorized a punishment range for a particular crime, the resulting sentence within that range constitutes punishment only for the convicted offense for purposes of the Double
Jeopardy Clause. 25 1 In part A, this Note asserts that the Sentencing
Guidelines require the same Double Jeopardy analysis as that traditionally used for sentencing. In part B, this Note contends that
although the Court did not explicitly address congressional intent regarding multiple convictions and "relevant conduct," its ruling is consistent with congressional intent. In part C, this Note explains why
Justice Stevens' distinction between the character of the defendant
and the character of the offense is flawed.
A.

TRADITIONAL DOUBLE JEOPARDY ANALYSIS AND THE SENTENCING
GUIDELINES

Contrary to Justice Stevens' dissent, 252 neither the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984253 nor the Sentencing Guidelines changed the traditional Double Jeopardy analysis of sentencing. While the Act
revolutionized the manner in which federal courts sentence offenders,2 54 it only modified sentencing goals, determinacy, and consis-

tency, not offense definitions or relevant constitutional theory.2 55
Traditionally, the federal courts exercised substantial discretion in imposing sentences within the broad statutory limits defined by Congress
for particular offenses. 256 The Act created the Sentencing Commis249 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See U.S.S.G., supranote
74, § 5K1.1.
250 Witte, 115 S. Ct. at 2214 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
251 See id at 2208.
252 Cf id. at 2210 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
253 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3742 (1994) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1994).

254 Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 132 (1991) (district court may not depart up-

ward from sentencing range established by Sentencing Guidelines without first notifying
parties that it intends to depart).
255 See U.S.S.G., supra note 74, ch. 1, pt. A, n.3 (policy statement).
256 See United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 52-53 (1978) (taking defendant's false testimony into account did not violate due process by punishing defendant for crime of perjury
for which he had not been indicted, tried, or convicted).
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sion in order to channel this discretion through comprehensive
guidelines.2 5 7 The purpose of the reform was "to eliminate the 'unwarranted disparit[ies] and... uncertainty' associated with indetermi2 58
nate sentencing."
The Sentencing Commission adopted a "charge offense" system
that contains several real offense elements, rather than a pure "real
offense" system.2 5 9 Under the Sentencing Guidelines, the offense of
conviction determines to which offense guideline the sentencing
court refers.2 60 Depending on the quantity of narcotics involved in a
defendant's narcotic offenses, the applicable offense guideline
designates a base offense level.2 61 The sentencing court must base the

quantity of narcotics on the defendant's "relevant conduct."2 62 Where
the offenses require grouping of multiple counts, "relevant conduct"
includes all acts that were "part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan at the offense of conviction" for which the defendant could be held accountable.2 6 Thus, the defendant's base
level indicates the composite quantity of narcotics involved in any "rel2
evant conduct" as well as in the offense of conviction. 64
Nothing in the Sentencing Guidelines suggests that a court will
punish a defendant more by considering "relevant conduct" in the
calculation of his offense level than a pre-Guidelines court would by
exercising its discretion in selecting a punishment within the statutory
limits.2 65 By recognizing that any convicted offense is more serious if
it exemplifies a pattern of criminal conduct, "relevant conduct"
merely demonstrates custom and directs future discretion.2 6 6 The
mandatory nature of the consideration of "relevant conduct" does not
257

See Burns, 501 U.S. at 132-33; Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363-67 (1989).

258 Burns, 501 U.S. at 133 (quoting S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 49 (1983))

(alterations in original).
259 U.S.S.G., supra note 74, ch. 1, pt. A, n.4(b). A pure "real offense" system bases the
sentence on all related conduct in which the defendant engaged, regardless of the elements of the offense of conviction. Id. A pure "charge offense" system bases the defendant's sentence solely on the conduct satisfying the elements of the offense of which the
defendant was convicted. Id.
260 Id. §§ 1Bl.1(a), 1B1.2(a). For further discussion on "real" versus "charge" offense
systems, compareWilliam W. Wilkins,Jr. &John R. Steer, Relevant Conduct: The Cornerstone of
the FederalSentencing Guidelines, 41 S.C. L. REv. 495 (1990) with David Yellen, Illusion, Illogic
and Injustice: Real Offense Sentencing and the FederalSentencing Guidelines, 78 MINN. L.RE,.
403, 428-31 (1993).
261 U.S.S.G., supra note 74, § 2Dl.1.
262 Id. §§ 1B1.2(b), 1B1.3.
263 Id § 1B1.3(a)(2).
264 See i § 2Dl.1.
265 Brief for the Respondent at 22, Witte v. United States, 115 S.Ct. 2199 (1995) (No.
94-6187).
266 Id.
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change the decision of whether the defendant is being punished for
that conduct.2 67 Moreover, the increased clarity of the Sentencing

Guidelines' sentencing process does not result in punishment for uncharged "relevant conduct" as if it were a distinct criminal offense.2 68
As occurred before the Sentencing Guidelines were enacted, the sen2 69
tencing court punishes a defendant solely for the convicted offense.
Historically, the DoubleJeopardy Clause allowed prosecution and
punishment for previously uncharged criminal conduct, even if a sentencing court considered that conduct in sentencing for a different
offense. 270 Whether the earlier consideration influenced the defendant's sentence within a Sentencing Guidelines range, or constituted
the court's discretionary enhancement as in pre-Guidelines cases, is
unimportant. 271 This conclusion is reasonable because the Sentencing Guidelines merely provide a formula for what was once left to the
sentencing judges' discretion. 27 2 Hence, the traditional Double Jeopardy analysis of sentencing applies to the Sentencing Guidelines.273
As a result, the Court applied the proper test to find that taking into
account "relevant conduct" in sentencing does not violate the Double
Jeopardy Clause in a subsequent prosecution for that conduct.
B.

CONGRESSIONAL INTENT REGARDING MULTIPLE CONVICTIONS AND
"RELEVANT CONDUCT"

The Supreme Court decided Witte without addressing congressional intent regarding multiple convictions and "relevant conduct."274 However, the majority's decision does comply with
congressional intent.2 7 5 First, the majority applied the Blockburger
"same elements" test in accordance with congressional intent. Second, the majority recognized that the Sentencing Commission anticipated situations similar to Witte's and provided safeguards for
them. 276 Finally, the majority abrogated two federal appellate court
267 Id. at 23. See United States v. Dunningan, 113 S. Ct. 1111, 1117-18 (1993) (rejecting
view that mandatory character of Sentencing Guidelines enhancement changes applicable
constitutional test).
268 Respondent's Brief at 23, Witte (No. 94-6187); Witte v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 2199,
2207 (1995).
269 Witte, 115 S. Ct. at 2207.
270 See, e.g., Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576 (1959).
271 See Witte, 115 S. Ct. at 2206.
272 United States v. Witte, 25 F.3d 250, 258 (5th Cir. 1994). Cf McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 92 (1986) (due process calculus does not change simply because
legislature made a sentencing factor mandatory).
273 See Witte, 115 S. Ct at 2211 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
274 See id. at 2204-09.
275 See id. at 2204.

276 See Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161,

165 (1977)

(legislature is free to define
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decisions that incorrectly interpreted congressional intent regarding
subsequent conviction for an offense that was considered as "relevant
2 77
conduct" in a previous sentencing.
In addressing multiple punishments, "the role of the constitutional guarantee is limited to assuring that the court does not exceed
its legislative authorization by imposing multiple punishments for the
same offense." 2 78 Courts enforcing the federal guarantee against mul-

tiple punishment must examine the various offenses for which a person is being punished to determine whether, as defined by the
legislature, any two or more of them are the same offense: "where the
same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory
provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two
offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact
279
that the other does not."
In Witte, the defendant was neither prosecuted nor convicted of
the cocaine offenses during the first criminal proceeding. The defendant pled guilty to and was sentenced for attempted possession of
marijuana with the intent to distribute it.280 In the second indictment, the defendant was charged with conspiracy to import cocaine
and attempted importation of cocaine. 2 81 According to the Blockburger"same elements" test,28 2 the second indictment did not charge
2 83
the same offense to which the defendant formerly had pled guilty.

Following the rationale of Blockburger, Congress intended the two offenses to be punished separately, and the Court properly treated the
subsequent proceeding as constitutional for purposes of the Double
Jeopardy Clause.
The Sentencing Commission anticipated situations similar to
Witte's and adopted § 5G1.3 to address them. If the Sentencing Commission had intended to preclude the subsequent proceeding, it
could have forbidden the prosecution of offenses where the "relevant
conduct" was already considered in sentencing for a different offense.2 8 4 However, neither the Sentencing Reform Act nor the Senpunishments).
277 Compare Witte, 115 S.Ct. at 2204, with United States v. Koonce, 945 F.2d 1145, 1153
(10th Cir. 1991) and United States v. McCormick, 992 F.2d 437, 439 (2d Cir. 1993) (Congress did not intend to allow multiple punishments for offenses considered "relevant
conduct").
278 Brown, 432 U.S. at 165.
279 Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).
280 See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B) (1994); 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1994).
281 See21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B); 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
282 Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304.
283 Witte v. United States, 115 S.Ct. 2199, 2204 (1995).
284 See Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977) (while Double Jeopardy Clause limits
prosecutorial and judicial action, it does not prevent legislature from assigning multiple

1566

SUPREME COURT REVIEW

[Vol. 86

tencing Guidelines impose such a restriction.2 8 5 Rather, § 5G1.3(b)
implicitly contemplates the possibility of separate prosecutions involv28 6
ing relevant conduct.
When a court sentences an imprisoned defendant for a second
offense committed before his imprisonment began, § 5G1.3(b) may
apply. Section 5G1.3(b) is relevant where the defendant has an undischarged prison term resulting from offenses considered in the first
conviction's sentence.2 8 7 The sentencing court takes into account the
offenses underlying the first conviction to determine the second conviction's offense level only if it is relevant conduct with respect to the
second conviction.2 8 8 Section 5G1.3(b) applies when the sentencing
court considers the offenses underlying the second conviction as "relevant conduct" in determining the first conviction's sentence because
"relevant conduct" is reciprocal.28 9 Section 5G1.3(b) addresses cases
where a defendant is prosecuted "for different criminal transactions
that were part of the same course of conduct."290 Thus, the Sentencing Commission did not contemplate that consecutive prosecutions
would be prohibited by considering "relevant conduct" in determining the first sentence. 291 Moreover, neither the Sentencing Reform
Act nor the Sentencing Guidelines prevent prosecutions involving the
same course of conduct.2

92

In conclusion, because the Sentencing

Guidelines contemplate sentencing multiple offenses separately, the
majority properly determined that there was no Double Jeopardy violation in Witte.
Although in Witte the Court did not explicitly discuss congressional intent, it complied with congressional intent when it discussed
the Sentencing Guidelines' procedural safeguards. The majority argued that "the Guidelines take into account the potential unfairness"
in § 5G1.3. 293 According to the majority, the Sentencing Guidelines
leave some discretion with the sentencing court in order to protect
the offender's rights. 2 94 Moreover, Witte could "vindicate his interests

through appropriate appeals" if the sentencing court misapplies the
punishments for same action).
285 See U.S.S.G., supra note 74, § 1B1.3.
286 See i&§ 5G1.3(b).
287 Id.
288 Id.
289 See Witte v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 2199, 2206 (1995) ("it makes no difference...
whether the enhancement occurred in the first or second sentencing proceeding").
290 U.S.S.G., supra note 74, § 5G1.3(b) cmt.
291 See i&.§ 5G1.3(b).
292 Id.

293 Wie, 115 S.Ct. at 2208 (discussing the coordination of sentences).
294 Id. at 2209.
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Sentencing Guidelines.295
In United States v. Koonce and United States v. McCormick, the Second and Tenth Circuits found that Congress did not intend to subject
defendants to muitiple punishments for drug offenses.2 96 However,
the Koonce court did not have the benefit of the current § 5G1.3(b),
which states that if the previous undischarged prison term resulted
from conduct taken into account in the determination of the instant
conviction's offense level, the instant conviction's sentence will run
concurrently to the previous undischarged prison term.2 97 Section
5G1.3 permits a defendant to be prosecuted and sentenced in more
than one federal proceeding for different criminal offenses that were
part of the same course of conduct.29 8 Section 5G1.3 reflects Congress' intent to prevent punishment from being more severe if the
government chooses to prosecute the defendant at two different proceedings, instead of only one proceeding. 29 9 Congress accomplished
this goal not by barring a second prosecution, but rather by mandating that the resulting prison term's length not be longer than that
which would have resulted from conviction on both counts at a single
proceeding.3 0 0
Though the Second Circuit had the benefit of § 5G1.3, it incorrectly distinguished § 5G1.3 from the situation in McCormick.30 ' In
considering whether § 5G1.3 applied to the facts of the case, the McCormick court found that the protections of § 5G1.3(b) apply where
punishment for a current offense is determined by taking into account conduct for which the defendant has previously been convicted
and sentenced; conversely, the court found that § 5G1.3(b) does not
apply to the situation that the Second Circuit faced, where sentencing
for a defendant's past conviction was based on conduct that is currently the subject of a second prosecution. 30 2 The McCormick court
incorrectly assessed § 5G1.3(b) because it ignored the application of
"relevant conduct" to sentencing for the first offense, and overlooked
295 Id. See FED. R. GrM. P. 35(a) (stating that court must correct sentence that is determined to have been imposed through incorrect application of Sentencing Guidelines).
296 United States v. McCormick, 992 F.2d 437, 442 n.1 (2d Cir. 1993) (Mahoney, J.,

dissenting) (noting that majority properly recognized that "in the sentencing area, congressional intent is reflected in the Sentencing Guidelines"); United States v. Koonce, 945
F.2d 1145, 1153 (10th Cir. 1991).
297 U.S.S.G., ,supra note 74, § 5G1.3(b).

298 Id. § 5G1.3 cmt. 2 ("Subsection (b) ... addresses cases in which the conduct resulting in the undischarged term of imprisonment has been fully taken into account under
§ 1B1.3 ("relevant conduct") in determining the offense level for the instant offense.").
299 See id. § 5G1.3 cmt. 2.
300 1& § 5G1.3(b).
301 United States v. McCormick, 992 F.2d 437, 441 n.3 (2d Cir. 1993).

302 Id.
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the possibility that the defendant could have been punished in the
30 3
second proceeding for his "relevant conduct."
In sum, the Witte majority followed congressional intent by finding that Witte could be sentenced for an offense considered "relevant
conduct" in his previous sentencing. First, the majority employed the
Blockburger "same elements" test, which reflects legislative intent to impose separate sanctions for multiple offenses arising in the course of a
single act or transaction. Second, the majority considered § 5G1.3
and other procedural safeguards found in the Sentencing Guidelines
which demonstrate congressional intent to punish crimes such as
Witte's separately. Finally, the majority abrogated two appellate decisions that misinterpreted congressional intent.
C.

THE INADEQUACIES OF JUSTICE STEVENS' DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE
CHARACTER OF THE DEFENDANT AND THE CHARACTER OF THE
OFFENSE

Justice Stevens' distinction between the character of the defendant and the character of the offense is unworkable. According to Justice Stevens, the cases that do not implicate the Double Jeopardy
Clause are those that only consider conduct as evidence of the defendant's character, including criminal history unrelated to the instant offense. 30 4 On the other hand, Justice Stevens contended, the Double
Jeopardy Clause is implicated where the sentencing court considers
the character of other offenses, which occurs when the conduct is
linked to the offense considered at sentencing. 30 5 Justice Stevens believed that the Sentencing Guidelines separate the character of the
defendant and the character of the offense into "criminal history" and
"relevant conduct," respectively. 30 6 If taken into account as "relevant
conduct" in determining the sentence for an offense, Justice Stevens
argued that such conduct should not be tried and sentenced separately because the sentencing court incorporated punishment for that
30 7
conduct in the first sentence.
Justice Stevens pointed to the Sentencing Guidelines "criminal
history" section 3 °8 to assert that a defendant is punished twice for an
offense when that offense was considered "relevant conduct" in a prea at 441 n.4.
Witte v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 2199,
and dissenting in part).
305 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
306 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
307 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
308 U.S.S.G., supra note 74, ch. 4, pt. A.
303

304

2211 (1995) (Stevens,J., concurring in part
dissenting in part).
dissenting in part).
dissenting in part).
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vious sentencing. 30 9 The "criminal history" section only accounts for
criminal actions by the defendant if he was under any criminal justice
sentence before or during his conviction. 310 Therefore, if left with
only "criminal history" as a reflection of the character of the defendant when sentencing him, those offenses that were committed in the
same course of conduct as the offense for which the defendant was
convicted would never be considered. 311 Justice Stevens' exclusion of
"relevant conduct" conflicts with the judges' traditional consideration
of these surrounding circumstances when sentencing a defendant.
Federal courts should consider a defendant's conduct surrounding an offense because it reflects the character of that defendant. Traditionally, sentencing courts have considered circumstances
surrounding an offense, other than the elements of the offense, where
the defendant who commits a crime reflects a need for increased punishment.3 1 2 Moreover, recidivist statutes have been declared constitutional because a defendant's repetition of crime demonstrates that his
31 3
character requires more severe punishment.
Without giving any guidance as to how the character of the defendant and the character of the offense should be used by the lower
courts in sentencing, Justice Stevens insisted that they should be assessed differently.3 14 Justice Stevens admitted that it is almost impossible to determine whether a sentencing court used an offense to assess
31 5
the character of the defendant or the character of the offense.
Consequently, differentiating between the character of the offense
and the character of the defendant serves no practical purpose.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The majority correctly decided that there was no violation of the
Double Jeopardy Clause in Witte. The role of the Double Jeopardy
309 Wizte, 115 S. Ct. at 2211 (Stevens,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Stevens argued that the character of the defendant was taken into account in the "Criminal
History" section, and that "relevant conduct" concerns only the character of the offense.
See supra text accompanying note 303.
310 See U.S.S.G., supra note 74, § 4A1.1.
311 See id. § 4A1.3 (policy statement). The sentencing court may depart from the Guide-

line range if reasonable information indicates that criminal history does not adequately
reflect the seriousness of the defendant's past criminal conduct, including "whether the
defendant was pending trial or sentencing on another charge at the time of the instant
offense."
312 Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576, 584-86 (1959) (sentencing court considered
murder of kidnaping victim, which increased defendant's sentence for kidnaping).
313 Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 732 (1948) (a crime committed by someone with a
prior conviction "is considered an aggravated one because a repetitive one").
314 See Witte v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 2199, 2208 (1995).
315 Id. at 2211 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Clause is limited to insuring that the court does not surpass its legislative authorization. The Court appropriately applied the traditional
Double Jeopardy analysis to the Sentencing Guidelines to find that
the subsequent prosecution of Witte was not a Double Jeopardy violation. The Court's decision complies with congressional intent, as evidenced by its proper application of the Blockburger "same elements"
test and its discussion of § 5G1.3 and other procedural safeguards. Finally, Justice Stevens' distinction between the character of the defendant and the character of the offense is inadequate because labeling
these categories separately does not aid a sentencing court in its duty
to take into account circumstances surrounding the offense. Therefore, the majority made the proper and most effective decision by
holding that prosecuting "relevant conduct" does not violate the
Double Jeopardy Clause.
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